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608 BRADSHAW CALIFORNIA EMP. STAR CoM. C.2d 
f<' No.1914:2. In Bank .• JmtP J9ilG.j 
,JACK W. BRAD8HAW, Aplwllant., v. UAfjll<'Ol~NIA BM. 
PLOYMI<JN'r STABILlZAT!ON COMMISSION et al., 
Hespondents. 
[1] Unemployment Insurance-Purpose.-The state's purpose in 
providing unemployment insurance is to reduce involuntary 
unemployment and the suffering caused thereby to a minimul!l. 
(Unempl. Ins. Code, § 100.) 
[2] !d.-Right to Benefits.-An unemployed person who satisfies 
the requirements of the Unemployment Insurance Act is en-
titled to receive from the Unemployment Fund payments 
reasonably sufficient to tide him over until he can secure em-
ployment. 
[3] !d.-Right to Benefits-Dismissal Pay.-An award of unem-
ployment benefits to a discharged employee for a period equal 
to the number of days' dismissal pay he received would 
duplicate such dismissal payments. 
[4] !d.-Right to Benefits-When Employee Deemed Unemployed. 
-Unempl. Ins. Code, § 1252, declaring that an individual is 
"unemployed" in any week during which he performs no 
services and with respect to which no wages are payable to 
him, contemplates that wage payments are to be allocated to 
specific periods, and the week "with respect to which" a wage 
payment is made by an employer to an employee depends 
on provisions of the employment contract. 
[5] !d.-Right to Benefits--Duplication of Payments.-Interpreta-
tions of employment contracts and of the Unemployment Insur-
ance Act that result in duplication of payments to a discharged 
employee are not encouraged. 
[6] !d.-Right to Benefits-Duplication of Payments.-The policy 
against duplication of payments to a discharged employee 
should not be thwarted by any so-called liberal construction of 
the Unemployment Insurance Act, especially when such con-
struction is not justified by language of the employment 
contract. 
[7] Id.-Purpose.-Unemployment insurance was not intended to 
protect employees already protected for the same period by 
their private contracts. 
[1] See Cal.Jur. 10-Yr. Supp. (1950 Rev.), Unemployment Relief 
-Insurance Act, § 3. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 7] Unemployment Insurance, § 2; 
[2-6, 8-10] Unemployment Insurance, § 18.5. 
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[9 J Id.~Right to Benefits-Dismissal Pay.~-Thc receipt of dis-
pay temporarily disqualifies an from claiming 
insurance benefits. 
flO J !d.-Right to Benefits-Dismissal Pay.~An employee's con-
t radual right to dismis:Sal paynwnts is not impaired by d1my-
him unemployment benefits for a period equal to tlu~ 
of days' dismissal pay he received. 
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J.-'l'he petitioner-appellant appeals from a judg-
ment entered after an order sustaining a demurrer to his 
for a writ of mandate to vacate a decision of thr 
California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board denying 
his claim for unemployment insurance benefits. 
For reasons of economy the petitioner was discharged from 
his with the San Francisco Chronicle on or about No-
Yember 29, 1952. Pursuant to a collective bargaining agree-
Jnent between hiR union and the Chronicle, he received upon 
46 C.2d-20 
C.2d 
in addition to his 
fraction his next 
as of the of his dis-
"vacation ') ; pay m 
lieu of two ·weeks' notice; and "dismissal ' in an 
amount upon his length of service. 
The filed for insurance 
The claims examiner of the of Employment 
decided that since he had received vacation pay, pay in 
of notice and dismissal pay to his for 41% 
he ·would not for benefits until 41% 
working after his discharge. After a a Depart-
ment of En1ployment referee affirmed the denial of benefits. 
'rhe Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board in turn af-
firmed the referee's decision and denied benefits. Bradshaw 
petitioned the superior court for a writ of mandate under 
Code of Civil Procedure, section 1094.5, to vacate the decision 
of the Appeals Board and grant him benefits for the 41% 
days covered the supplemental payments. A demurrer 
to the petition was sustained, Bradshaw elected not to amend 
and judgment 1vas entered for the respondents. 
The petitioner does not now contest the decisions denying 
him benefits because he received vacation pay and pay in 
lieu of notice. This court will therefore consider only the 
propriety of denying unemployment benefits for a period equal 
to the number of days' dismissal pay he received. 
This case calls for an interpretation of section 1252 of the 
Unemployment Insurance Code. In part, that section pro-
vides: "An individual is 'unemployed' in any week during 
which he performs no serYices and with respect to which no 
wages are payable to him . . . . '' Section 1251 provides 
that unemployment compensation benefits are payable to 
"unemployed individuals." It is conceded by the petitioner 
that dismissal payments under the contract are "wages" 
within the meaning of that term as used in section 1252. 
'l'he question then is whether dismissal payments are payable 
"with respect to" a period before the employee's date of 
discharge or ''with respect to'' a period after that date. The 
petitioner contends that dismissal payments are made "with 
respect to'' the weeks during which he admittedly performed 
services for the Chronicle. The respondents contend that 
such payments are made "with respect to' the weeks fol-
lowing the petitioner's discharge. Decisions in other states 
on the subject herein discussed are not helpful. It is stated 
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secure Althoug·h dismissal pay cover-
the contract was broader than coverage under thr 
Insurance Act, the fact still remains that 
of unemployment bcucfits to the pet.itioner for the 
wonld seem to duplicate the dismissal pay-
has reeeived. 
Section 1252 thai wage are to 
to 'J'he week "with respect io 
which" a ·wage payment is made by :-m to an em-
upon the of the employment con-
trael. [5] However, interpretations of employment contracts 
Unemployment Insuranee Aet that result in dupli-
to a discl1arged are not encour-
finds in decisions of this court 
duplication of ·workmen's by unem-
disability benefits. ( GarC?:n v. Industr£d Ace. Corn., 
689 [263 P.2d ; Aetna Dife Ins. Co. v. Industrial 
38 Cal.2d 599 [241 P.2d 530] ; Bryant v. Indus-
37 Cal.2d 215 P.2d 32].) [6] The 
duplication of should not he 
thwarted by any so-called liberal construction of the act, 
when such construction is not justified by the 
of the contract. [7] Unemployment insurance 
intended to protect protected for 
period their 
TlH: 
who claims 1;vhat appear to bed 
that no The 
'rhe record disdoses that he hat> seeJJ 
of the contract. 'l'hat Ian-
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guage alone is insufficient to establish that the dismissal 
payments were made ''with respect to'' a period before dis-
charge and thus would not be duplicated by an award of 
unemployment compensation. 
[9] A holding that dismissal payments should be dis-
regarded in determining whether an employee is entitled to 
unemployment benefits would create an anomalous distinction 
between dismissal pay on the one hand and ''in lieu of notice 
pay" and "vacation pay" on the other. There is authority 
in this state to the effect that the receipt of "vacation pay" 
or "in lien of notice pay" temporarily disqualifies an em-
ployee from claiming unemployment insurance benefits. (See 
Shand v. California Emp. Stab. Com., 124 Cal.App.2d 54 
r268 P.2d 193]; Jones v. California Ernp. Stab. Com., 120 
Cal.App.2d 770 [262 P.2d 91] .) By analogy dismissal pay 
should have the same effect. The petitioner, however, notes 
that in Gilliam v. California Ernp. Stab. Corn., 130 Cal.App. 
2d 102 [278 P.2d 528], one sort of supplemental payment 
was held not to disqualify the recipient from claiming un-
employment insurance benefits. In that case the employees 
had the option of working without vacation and receiving pay 
in lieu thereof. Upon discharge they were given pay in lieu 
of a vacation they had not taken during a prior period. The 
court distinguished the Shand and ,Jones cases by pointing 
out that in those cases the employee while he was employed 
did not have the option of taking extra pay in lieu of vacation 
-he could only be sure of getting that extra pay if he was 
discharged. The factual situation was obviously different 
in the Gilliam case, and the court there concluded that ''in 
lieu" vacation payments could be allocated to a period before 
discharge notwithstanding the Shand and ,Jones cases. The 
petitioner contends that dismissal pay is more analogous to 
"in lien" vacation pay than to the normal vacation pay 
inYolved in the Shand and .Jones caRes. This contention is 
untenable. As noted, the basis for the Gilliam award was 
the employee's option while he was employed to receive the 
supplemental payments. In contrast, the dismissal payments 
made to the petitioner were not available to him unless and 
nntil his employment was terminated. 
The petitioner complains that the Unemployment Insurance 
Appeals Board has taken inconsistent positions with respect 
to the treatment of dismissal pay. It is said that when deter-
mining whether a claimant has qualified for benefits by earn-
ing sufficient money during a base period prior to his discharge 
Co~r. 613 
, Board 
when it is received. It 
"'"'"n''"'t~r of the board's practice 
the purpose of determining tbe 
"'""'"''"' the base is not involved 
Both contracting parties contend that the allocation 
the opposition is in violation of the constitutional 
against impairment of the obligation of contracts. 
"ffi~'"''"" of the judgment in ease will not affect the 
the petitioner under his employment contract. His 
dismissal payments will not be impaired. Nor would 
be forced to make two payments under the 
:~.-nlr'""''"r''~" contract in the event of a reversal. 
is concluded that the Appeals Board and the superior 
properly construed the statute and held that, as a matter 
law on the undisputed facts, the receipt of dismissal pay 
prevented the petitioner from qualifying for 
benefits. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
J., and McComb, J., concurred. 
SCHAUER, J.-I concur in the judgment and, generally, 
opinion except insofar as it may be deemed to indicate 
of GilUam v. California Emp. Stab. Oom. (1955), 
Cal.App.2d 102 [278 P.2d 528]. 
J.-I dissent. 
majority opinion fails to give the liberal construction 
of unemployment insurance laws ( Gania v. Indus-
Ac:e. Oom., 41 Cal.2d 689, 693 (263 P.2d 8] ), ignores 
ature of dismissal pay and is contrary to the trend of 
elsewhere. It seems clear to me that where, as 
compensation for services performed is deferred until 
an employee is discharged, and then paid to him, it 
not constitute payment for such services during any 
f time after discharge with respect to which wages 
to him and hence he is entitled to unemployment 
peJasa,twn under Unemployment Insurance Code, section 
from the date of his discharge. 
must examine the collective bargaining agreement under 
petitioner was entitled to dismissal pay, vacation pay 
two weeks' notice of discharge or pay, because the nature 
DISMISSAL PAY. vVhen an other 
from the terms of this contract as 
he shall receive a cash dismissal pay-
ment in a s~on in accordance with the following schedule 
years of continuous and employment: .... 
'' From the dismissal pay the publisher may deduct 
any or tax to which the employee is subject under local, 
state or federal legislation. 
'' Dismissal pay shall be computed at the highest weekly 
salary (exclusive of bonuses and payments for special work) 
for the fifty-two (52) weeks previous to discharge .... 
VACATIONS. Employees shall receive one week's vacation 
with pay after six months' continuous employment; two 
weeks' vacation with pay after one year's continuous em-
ployment. Employees who have been continuously employed 
for three years as of October 15th in the year which his vaca-
tion is scheduled shall receive three weeks' vacation with 
pay." (Emphasis added.) Thus it is seen the dismissal pay 
is payable in a lump sum and is computed on the length of 
prior service and the amount of pay during that service. This 
is, in effect, a payment of deferred wages or wages held back 
by the employer. It is not pay for the future after the 
employee is discharged. It is somewhat analogous to pensions 
which are considered as deferred compensation for services 
already rendered. (Wallace v. City of Fresno, 42 Cal.2d 
180, 184 [265 P.2d 884] .) No doubt, in the negotiations lead-
ing to the agreement in fixing wages, consideration was given 
to the dismissal pay. 
In the above light we look at section 1252 which provides: 
''An individual is 'unemployed' in any week during which 
he performs no services and with respect to which no wages 
are payable to him .... " (Unempl. Ins. Code, § 1252.) 
The employee-petitioner-performed no services and no 
wages were paid to him with respect to any week during 
which he performed no services because the dismissal pay 
was not for time after the discharge, it being deferred wages, 
and was not allocated to any week after discharge because 
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seems 
is allowed in this 
will be a donble payment for the same thing-
idleness-one from the state and the other from 
That is not true. Assuming that the sums 
are for unemployment, still it 
to say that it is in addition to unemployment 
inasmuch as the latter is no more than a bare 
subsistence. Moreover, the argument of the majority is based 
false premise that unemployment compensation is 
where the employee is nee(1y when obviously his 
stauding has nothing to do with it. He is entitled 
compensation no matter how much he is 1vorth and, 
the sum payable under the agreement is in effect 
savings from his past wages vvhere the employer 
banker. He is not, therefore, being paid double, for 
under thr agreement is from his own money. 
if the employer had deposited a portion of the 
's >Yages in a trust fund to be to him only in 
of unemployment, it coulcl not be claimed that he 
entitled to unemployment compensation. The provi-
well as the improvident employee is entitled to un-
compensation under the hnv. vVhy should he be 
less so when he is provident because an agreement 
between his union and his rmployer 1nakes him so with the 
coopPrat ion of his employer 
construction of the statui e in ael'ord with the above 
has been foll!YWe<l in other states. In Ackct-son v_ 
Union Tel. 2:l4 Minn. 271 N.W.2(1 338], it 
held that employees diseharged hel'ause of mechanizatiou 
"severance" pay based on the period of prior 
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service under a collective bargaining agreement, the same as 
the dismissal pay here, were entitled to unemployment com-
pensation under an unemployment compensation statute the 
same as ours. The court said: ''Section 268.04, subd. 23, 
provides that an individual shall be deemed unemployed in 
any week in which he performs no service and with respect 
to which no wages are payable to him. It is clear that from 
the use of the conjunctive 'and,' before an individual may 
be deemed to be unemployed, two things must exist : ( 1) He 
must perform no service during the week; and (2) he must 
be paid no wages for the week. In the case now before us, 
the first of those requirements clearly exists. Upon election 
to receive severance pay, the employment was completely 
severed. No claim is made that other employment was ob-
tained. The employe was registered for work. So far as 
her former employer was concerned, she could do as she 
pleased from the date of separation. Relator claims, how-
ever, that the second prerequisite to 'unemployment' is lack-
ing, in that severance pay constitutes wages for the number 
of weeks following the employe's separation which have been 
used to compute the amount thereof. . . . Suffice to say that 
it is the declared public policy of our state, as shown by the 
legislative declaration of public policy in the act, § 268.03, 
that benefits are intended to extend to those who are unem-
ployed through no fault of their own. . . . In the case now 
before us, relator was not only legally obligated under its 
contract to make the severance payments upon the election of 
the discharged employes to receive them, but the payments 
were not designated as wages for a specific future period of 
time. . . . Severance pay was in no way related to or de-
pendent upon the employe's employment status after separa-
tion. She received the payment even though she might 
secure a job the next day. It is true that the amount was 
measured by the length of service, but there may have been 
many reasons for adopting the length of service as the yard-
stick in determining the amount of severance pay clue a dis-
charged employe. . . . It is undoubtedly true that one of 
the objectives of dismissal or severance pay, such as we have 
to deal with here, is to ease the employe's financial burden 
while looking for a new job. However, there are other 
objectives which we must al!'lo keep in mind in considering 
the nature of such payment. Partial compensation for loss 
of seniority rights; loss of ]HJSKiblP pension rights; compen-
























tlw continued servir1~ of its 
when :meh sel'Vi(~<'S eould be di;.;lwnsed witlL 
thut to allow claimants io n~eover henP-
eiremnstances is to penalize rdator by 
Llouble ullder the contract, namely, pay-
pay, and the adverse cffeet it "Will haYe upon 
trihution rate to the unemployment compensa-
'l'Imt may yery lYell be true, hut it strikes us that 
whid1 more properly should be addressed to 
than to the courts. JJikewise, relator argues 
of benefits gives the employe double benefits m· 
in allowing her to receive severance pay and at 
time eolleet unemployment benefits. 'fhat may or 
he depending upon the construction placed 
na1nre of the severance pay. In a11y r·vent, it is true, 
of the employment status of the employe after 
If she procured a new position the day after 
she would retain her severance pay and the wages 
and no one would contend that she should not be 
to rrtain both. Unemployment compensation is 
intended to take the place of wages which could have 
llad Rhc been employcct." (Ackerson v. 1Vestcrn 
234 Minn. 271 [48 N.W.2ct 338, 340-342].) 
same effect are Western Union Tel. Co. v. Texas 
., (Tex.CiY.App.) 243 S.W.2r1 217; Dubois \'. 
~'~''''r""' Com., -- - Me. -- [114 A.2d 35!1] ; 
Mim:ng Co. v. Unemployment Comp. Boanl of 
I'a.Snpcr. 2G6 [75 A.2d 8]. It has been well 
the Ackerson case, supt·a: "First, need or 
is not a requircmeut for eligibility for emu-
Receipt of income from other sources does not 
a claimant, for the purpose of these laws is to 
a person's resources during periods of unem-
Seeond, the claimant concededly would have re-
sevcrance payment eYen if she had obtained a new 







nn'"'fl'"" that the severance pay 
to dismissal. 
inclusion of a 
gr<~ellrleilts extend be-
's immediate finan-
Severance pay is 
for loss of seniority 
rights, and compensation for 
the latter especially 
case. From the employer's view-
clauses are included as a means of 
both as to workers and to the com-
'l'hese factors strongly suggest that the parties to 
the contract intended the severance payment clause to have 
no relation to the worker's employment status after dismissal, 
and, more significantly, that the court reached the proper 
result in concluding that, in view of the terms of the contract, 
there should be no relation between eligibility for unemploy-
ment compensation and receipt of severance pay." (100 U. 
Pa.L.Rev. 144, 145; see also 64 IIarv.L.Rev. 681.) 
The question here involved has broad implications in view 
of the so-called guaranteed annual wage arrangements which 
have been made notably in the automobile industry. In the 
Ford contract for illustration, there is a provision for pay-
ment to the employee when involuntarily laid off and such 
payment is defined as a supplementation which means the 
right to receive both payment from the employer and un-
employment compensation from the state without reduction. 
Under unemployment insurance laws similar to ours, the state 
officials have said that such supplementation is proper in 
Connecticut, Delaware, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey 
and New York. (2 C.C.H. Unemp. Ins. Rep. (Conn.) para. 
8380; id. (Del.) para. 8088; 4 id. (Mass.), para. 8188; id. 
(Mich.) para. 8522; 5 id. (N.J.) para. 8271; 36 Lab. ReL Rep. 
715; 69 Harv.L.Rev. 362.) The attorney general of this state 
ruled on February 10, 1956, that the employer's payment under 
the Ford plan does not render the employee ineligible for un-
employment compensation under our law. (27 Ops. Cal. Atty. 
Gen. 71.) The common theory in those determinations is 
that the payments by the employer are not wages paid with 
respect to the IYeek for which unemployment compensation is 
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